11 of 12 August 2023 The 1805 Dispatches #23.04 But if he would allow me, I would bear up and try with the lead, and lead him as close as I could with safety." According to Hood himself, that is, Nelson asked not "if there was depth of water sufficient for our ships between the enemy and the shore, but whether there was depth of water enough for the British ships to clear the shoal. The most expressive bit of evidence is given, all unconsciously, by Hood a little later. He was following the lead of the Goliath straight towards the Guerrier, the ship at the head of the French line. "That ship", he says, "being in five fathoms of water, I expected the Goliath and the Zealous to stick on the shoal every moment and did not imagine we should attempt to pass within her!" That sentence proves that if Nelson had discussed with his captains the plan of surrounding the head of the enemy's line, the circumstance had made no impression on Hood's imagination or memory. It was the last thing he expected to see done! Had he lead, the famous manoeuvre would never have taken place. Foley, whose ship it must be remembered, was the lightest 74 in the fleet - she was a ship of only 1604 tons - had more of Nelson's own insight and daring than Hood, and so did just what Nelson himself would have done, had the Vanguard, instead of the Goliath, lead the British fleet into the fight. Another bit of direct, and what ought to be authoritative, evidence is supplied by Admiral Browne, who for some time served with Foley as first lieutenant of Elephant. Browne says that he was in the constant habit of conversing with Foley about the great fight, and adds, "I can speak positively to the fact of his having stated that he led the British fleet inside without any previous order or arrangement." Nelson's General plan for the coming battle was clear. He would attack the French fleet at sight, and wherever he found it. But Browne wrote this in 1845; and the recollection of a conversation which took place at a distance of nearly half a century can hardly be regarded as decisive. Nelson's General plan for the coming battle was clear. He would attack the French fleet at sight, and wherever he found it. If he found the Frenchmen lying at anchor, he would throw the whole of his strength on a part of Bruey's' line and so crush one half it before the other half could come to the help of the ships attacked. Which half must be first attacked would depend on questions of wind and position, which could not be known until the enemy's fleet was in sight. And exactly on this general plan the battle was actually fought. "By tackling the enemy's van and centre, the wind blowing right along their line, I was enabled to throw whatever force I pleased on the French ships." this is Nelson's own statement of the plan of the battle written afterwards for Lord Howe. But, there were two possible ways of carrying out this plan. One British ship might be anchored on the bow, and another on the quarter of each French ship in turn; or British ships could be placed on both sides of each French ship. Foley's daring lead round the head of the enemy's line decided in favour of the latter plan; but it seems highly probable that Nelson himself was in favour of the first plan; and that might well have proved even more effective than the tactics Foley actually adopted. If a British ship had been anchored on the bow and quarter of each French ship the latter could have opposed only one broadside or two. With an enemy lying on both sides of her she was able to fight both broadsides at once. The British ships, moreover, firing across so narrow an interval, inflicted much injury on each other. Foley's plan, however, had an advantage which could hardly have been foreseen, and which, in a sense, was a pure accident. The French, with great slovenliness, had not cleared their port batteries - the guns that is, on the inner side of their line. They were choked with lumber and obstructions of every kind. A comparison of the losses onboard the British ships shows that the French guns in the port batteries had less than half the effectiveness of their starboard guns, or those on the outer side of the line. A study of all the evidence available proves, in brief, that Foley's fine and daring lead was exactly in the line of Nelson's predetermined tactics; it only settled the question of the particular way in which these tactics should be carried out. If any proof, indeed, is wanted of Nelson's great qualities as a leader, it is found in the very feature of the great fight at the Nile out of which this debate has arisen. He had discussed beforehand with his captains how to meet every possible contingency in the approaching fight; he had stamped his ideas indelibly upon them. And when the enemy's fleet was sighted there was no need to waste time in signalling. He could trust his captains to lead into the fight without a moment's, pause, and in exactly the fashion which would make his plans most effective. That was leadership! The Battle of The Nile George Cruikshank https://pixels.com/featured/the-battle-ofthe-nile-george-cruikshank.html
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